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Abstract—Reduced installation and operating costs give energy
storage systems an opportunity to participate actively and prof-
itably in electricity markets. In addition to providing ancillary
services, energy storage systems can also arbitrage temporal
price differences. Congestion in the transmission network often
accentuates these price differences and will under certain cir-
cumstances enhance the profitability of arbitrage. On the other
hand, congestion may also limit the ability of a given storage
device to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
This paper analyzes how transmission congestion affects the
profitability of arbitrage by storage devices in markets with
perfect and imperfect competition. Imperfect competition is
modeled using a bilevel optimization where the offers and bids
submitted by the storage devices can alter the market outcome.
Price-taker and price-maker assumptions are also investigated
through market price duration curves. This analysis is based
on simulating an entire year of market operation on the IEEE
Reliability Test system.
Index Terms—Energy Storage, Bilevel Programming, MPEC,
Network-Constrained Market Clearing, Transmission Congestion
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
B Set of buses, indexed by b.
I Set of conventional generators, indexed by i.
L Set of transmission lines, indexed by l.
H Set of storage devices, indexed by h.
W Set of wind generators, indexed by w.
T Set of time intervals, indexed by t.
f(l)/t(l) Indices of sending/receiving buses of line l.
B. Variables
chsh,t/dish,t Quantity of charging bid/discharging offer of
storage h at time t, MW.
ρchsh,t /ρ
dis
h,t Price of charging bid/discharging offer of stor-
age h at time t, $/MWh.
db,t Load at bus b at time t, MW.
pGi,t Power output of conventional generator i at
time t, MW.
pWw,t Power output of wind generator w at time t,
MW.
pfl,t Power flow on line l at time t, MW.
q
dis/chs
h,t Cleared discharging/charging rate for storage h
at time t, MW.
SoCh,t State of charge of storage h at time t, MWh.
x
dis/chs
h,t Binary variable representing the discharg-
ing/charging status of energy storage h at time
t. This variable is equal to 1 if discharg-
ing/charging and 0 otherwise.
θb,t Voltage phase angle at bus b at time t, radians.
λb,t Dual variables associated with the power bal-
ance constraint at bus b at time t.
C. Parameters
Cbidh Charging price bid to reflect storage owners’
willingness to pay for charging and marginal
charging cost of storage h, $/MW.
C
dis/chs
h Marginal discharging/charging cost of storage
h, $/MW.
CGi /C
W
w Offer price of conventional generator i / wind
generator w, $/MWh.
CDb Bid price of consumers at bus b, $/MWh.
dish/chsh Discharging/charging rate limits of storage h,
MW.
ηdish /η
chs
h Discharging/charging efficiency of storage h.
¯
Db,t/D¯b,t Min/max bounds on consumers bid at bus b at
time t, MW.
F¯l Power flow limit on line l, MW.
¯
Pi/P¯i Min/max power output limits of generator i,
MW.
SoCh/SoCh Min/max state-of-charge of storage h, MWh.
SoCinith Initial state of charge of storage h, MWh.
Xl Reactance of line l.
WFw,t Forecast output power of wind generator w at
time t, MW.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its declining installation and operation cost, energy
storage systems are likely to play an increasing role not only
in power system operation but also in electricity markets.
Because of its flexibility, storage can be used for energy
arbitrage [1], transmission congestion relief [2], reserves [3],
frequency regulation [4], post-contingency corrective actions
[5] and other services. In order to encourage the deployment
of energy storage, market rules are being revised to support
products and pricing schemes better suited to the technical
characteristics and constraints of storage systems [6].
In a vertically-integrated environment, energy storage is
used to minimize the system operating cost. For example,
Pandzic et al. [1], Qiu et al. [7] and Ferna´ndez-Blanco et
al. [8] investigated the optimal siting and sizing of storage
systems used for spatio-temporal arbitrage. The authors of [9]
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
04
81
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
5 F
eb
 20
17
proposed a bilevel storage planning strategy that guarantees the
recovery of the investment costs. Wogrin et al. [10] proposed
to allocate storage for load-shifting and regulation services.
Wen et al. [5] demonstrated the effectiveness of storage for
post-contingency corrective actions. However, minimizing the
operating cost, or more generally maximizing the benefits to
the system, typically does not lead to a charging/discharging
schedule that maximizes the profits of a merchant storage
owner. Operation and planning of storage in a competitive
market environment is therefore gaining increasing attention.
Castillo et al. [11], Shafiee et al. [12], and Mohsenian-Rad
[13] proposed techniques to maximize the operating profits of
storage in a decentralized environment. Ding et al. [14] coor-
dinated the operation of storage and wind farms in a rolling
real-time market. Xu et al. [6] analyzed the batteries’ profits
for regulation services considering its degradation costs [15],
[16]. Khani et al. [17] proposed to perform arbitrage while
relieving transmission congestion. Relative to [12]–[17], this
paper models impacts of local and system-wide transmission
congestion and bidding of other market participants.
A large number of papers discuss how network constraints
and transmission congestion affect electricity markets and
influence the bidding strategy of market participants, e.g. [18]–
[20]. However, previous work focused on system-wide trans-
mission congestion, while this paper examines how storage
can affect or be affected by local transmission congestion. This
paper makes three contributions:
1) A network-constrained market-clearing mechanism with
storage participation is analyzed under perfect and im-
perfect competition. Perfect competition is modeled as
an economic dispatch problem, while imperfect com-
petition is modeled using a bilevel approach where the
storage owner behaves strategically.
2) The effect of local transmission congestion on the annual
operating profit of storage is quantified to show how it
affects the behavior of storage owners.
3) The importance of optimizing siting and sizing decisions
on the storage profitability is discussed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the mathematical formulation of a network-
constrained market clearing with storage participation under
perfect and imperfect competition. Section III presents a
detailed case study based on a year-long simulation of storage
operation in the IEEE RTS. The influence of local transmission
capacity, price-taker/price-maker assumption and storage siting
decisions are discussed. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
This section provides the mathematical formulation of a
network-constrained market clearing with storage participation
under perfect and imperfect competition.
A. Market Clearing under Perfect Competition
Under perfect competition, each market participant bids or
offers at its marginal cost because none of them is assumed
to be able to exercise market power. The ISO then clears the
market in a way that maximizes the social welfare. Storage
owners participate in the market by submitting bids and offers
that reflect their willingness to charge and discharge. These
bids and offers should take into account how battery cycling
affects the life of the battery, i.e. its incremental degradation
cost. Market clearing takes the form of a network-constrained
economic dispatch problem. Storage owners and other market
participants pay or are paid based on their locational marginal
prices (LMPs).
max ObjSO =
∑
b,t
CDb db,t +
∑
h,t
Cbidh q
chs
h,t
−
∑
i,t
CGi p
G
i,t −
∑
h,t
Cdish q
dis
h,t
(1)
0 ≤ qchsh,t ≤ chshxchsh,t , ∀h,∀t (2)
0 ≤ qdish,t ≤ dishxdish,t , ∀h,∀t (3)
xdish,t + x
chs
h,t ≤ 1, ∀h,∀t (4)
xdish,t , x
chs
h,t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀h,∀t (5)
SoCh,t = SoCh,t−1 + qchsh,t η
chs
h − qdish,t /ηdish , ∀t > 1,∀h (6)
SoCh,t = SoC
init
h + q
chs
h,t η
chs
h − qdish,t /ηdish , t = 1,∀h (7)
SoCh ≤ SoCh,t ≤ SoCh, ∀h,∀t (8)
SoCh,NT = SoC
init
h , ∀h (9)
0 ≤ pGi,t ≤ P¯i, ∀i,∀t (10)
0 ≤ pWw,t ≤WFw,t, ∀w,∀t (11)
¯
Db,t ≤ db,t ≤ D¯b,t, ∀b,∀t (12)
db,t +
∑
b|f(l)=b
pfl,t −
∑
b|t(l)=b
pfl,t =
∑
i
pGb(i),t +
∑
w
pWb(w),t +
∑
h
(qdisb(h),t − qchsb(h),t), ∀b,∀t
(13)
pfl,t =
1
Xl
(θf(l),t − θt(l),t), ∀l,∀t (14)
− F¯l ≤ pfl,t ≤ F¯l, ∀l,∀t (15)
− pi ≤ θb,t ≤ pi,∀b 6= ref,∀t (16)
θb,t = 0, b = ref,∀t. (17)
The objective function (1) maximizes the social welfare
which includes generation and storage discharging offers as
well as the consumers and storage charging bids. Constraints
(2)–(3) set the limits on the storage bid/offer quantities. Eqs.
(4)–(5) prevent simultaneous charging and discharging by
enforcing constraints on binary variables. Constraints (6)–(8)
track the state of charge (SoC) and enforce the limits on their
operating range. Constraint (9) forces the final SoC to be
identical to the initial SoC. Constraints (10)–(12) enforce the
lower and upper bounds on the thermal generation, wind farms,
and consumers. Constraint (13) is the nodal power balance.
Constraint (14) calculates the power flows using a dc load
flow model. Constraints (15)–(17) enforce the limits on the
line flows and the voltage angles.
B. Market Clearing under Imperfect Competition
In an imperfectly competitive market, storage can achieve
larger profits through strategic bidding and offering. This
strategic behavior can be modeled as a bilevel program that
captures the interactions between the merchant storage and
the ISO. In the upper level, storage maximizes its operating
profits and determines the price/quantity bids and offers to be
submitted to the ISO. The lower level represents a network-
constrained market clearing as described in the previous sec-
tion. The accepted bids, offers and market-clearing locational
marginal prices are fed back to the upper level where they are
used to calculate the profits of storage.
max ObjESS =
∑
h,t
[λb(h),t(q
dis
h,t−qchsh,t )−Cdish qdish,t−Cchsh qchsh,t ]
(18)
ρdish,t , ρ
chs
h,t ≥ 0, ∀h,∀t (19)
0 ≤ chsh,t ≤ chshxchsh,t , ∀h,∀t (20)
0 ≤ dish,t ≤ dishxdish,t , ∀h,∀t (21)
Constraints (4)–(9) (22)
λb,t, q
dis
h,t , q
chs
h,t ∈ arg max
{
SW =
∑
b,t
CDb db,t
+
∑
h,t
ρchsh,t q
chs
h,t −
∑
h,t
ρdish,t q
dis
h,t −
∑
i,t
CGi p
G
i,t
(23)
0 ≤ qchsh,t ≤ chsh,t, ∀h,∀t (24)
0 ≤ qdish,t ≤ dish,t, ∀h,∀t (25)
Constraints (10)–(17)
}
. (26)
The upper-level objective function (18) maximizes the
storage profits based on the LMPs and the cleared charg-
ing/discharging quantities. Constraint (19) enforces the non-
negativity of bid and offer prices submitted by the storage. This
constraint could be relaxed in systems with high renewable
penetration where negative electricity prices can occur. Con-
straints (20)–(21) set the limits on the quantity bids and offers.
Other constraints on storage operation are identical to those
described in the previous section. LMPs and cleared quantities
are obtained from the lower-level problem. This lower-level
problem maximizes the social welfare (23). Partial-bids and
offers for storage charging and discharging are accepted in
constraints (24)–(25). Other constraints on market clearing
(26) are again identical to those described in the previous
section.
This bilevel formulation is nonlinear and non-convex. How-
ever, under the assumption of convexity of the lower level,
it can be parametrized using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker op-
timality conditions. The complementary slackness conditions
are further linearized using the Fortuny-Amat and McCarl
transformation [21]. The nonlinear terms in the objective
function are also linearized using the strong duality condition.
The resulting single-level equivalent is a mixed-integer linear
program that can be solved with commercial solvers. Interested
readers are referred to [22]–[25] for further details.
III. CASE STUDY
The proposed market models have been tested on the
modified version of the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS)
[1], Fig. 1. This test system consists of 24 buses, 32 generators,
38 transmission lines, and 5 wind farms. The day-ahead wind
power forecasts were generated based on the NREL Eastern
Wind Dataset and allow us to assess the proposed models over
a one-year simulation horizon. We assume one storage with
the optimized parameters from [1]: dish = chsh = 93 MW,
SoCh = 629 MWh, ηdish = η
chs
h = 0.9, SoC
init
h = 315
MWh, Cdis/chsh = 0 $/MWh, C
bid
h = 30 $/MWh.
All simulations were carried out using GAMS 23.7 and
CPLEX 12.5 on a Intel Xenon 2.55 GHz processor with 32
GB RAM. The computation time for each single day is less
than or equal to 5 s with the MILP gap set to 0.005 %.
To examine the effect of local congestion on the transmis-
sion network, we first scale up the original line capacities by
50% to ensure that there is no congestion in the network,
and that the LMP is the same at all buses. We then gradually
reduce the capacities of the lines connected to the bus where
the storage is located. Other line capacities remain unchanged
in order to avoid congestion across the system. We adopted
this approach because we wanted to focus on what happens
when storage is not able to deliver its flexibility. By comparing
operating profits when locating storage at different buses, we
show how siting decisions affect storage profitability.
Figure 2 shows how the annual profit collected by the
storage changes as the local line capacities are reduced when
this storage is located at four different buses. Decreasing
these line capacities tends to increase the LMP, which in
Fig. 1: IEEE One-Area Reliability Test System.
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Fig. 2: Typical patterns of annual storage profits.
turn tends to improve the profitability of storage for all four
locations. However, these figures show that different patterns
are possible. For example, if the storage is located at buses 2,
18 or 19, at some point the increase in LMP resulting from a
reduction in transmission capacity is offset by a reduction in
the amount of energy that the storage can physically deliver
to the rest of the system. On the other hand, if the storage
is located at bus 14, profitability increases monotonically as
the local transmission capacity decreases. Factors such as the
location of conventional and wind generation, the size and
location of the loads, the topology of the network as well
as the transmission capacity at nearby buses determine how
local congestion affects storage profitability. While patterns
for perfect and imperfect competition are similar, strategic
bidding significantly increases profitability particularly when
local congestion is significant.
Figure 3 shows the annual profit and social welfare for all
possible storage locations under a 50% line capacity reduction.
Imperfect competition enhances storage profitability for all lo-
cations but causes a reduction in the social welfare. Compared
with the base case, storage can collect more or less profits
depending on the location. This pattern is relatively consistent
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Fig. 3: Annual profits at various buses under a 50% reduction in line
transmission capacity.
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Fig. 4: Locational marginal price duration curve with a 50% line
capacity reduction.
regardless of whether competition is perfect or imperfect. In
terms of social welfare, the shapes of both cases are reasonably
similar. For buses 15–19, social welfare is more sensitive
to the congestion level. Strategic behavior actually does not
result in a significant loss of social welfare. These observations
motivate the search for the optimal storage locations because
such locations would ensure that storage collects enough
revenue while being less affected by congestion in the system.
Figure 4 shows the LMP duration curve at buses 14 and
19 based on a year-long simulation for the base case and
for a 50% reduction on line capacity. The prices in perfect
and imperfect competition are relatively close, but slightly
more favorable for merchant storage in case of imperfect
competition. On the other hand, comparing the prices for the
base case shows that local congestion increases the average
nodal price. The top left area of both plots suggest that high
prices happen more frequently than in the base case, while the
bottom right areas show that low prices happen less frequently.
Significant penetration of renewables causes periods of zero
or negative prices occur and are made more frequent by local
congestion as shown in the plot for bus 14.
Figure 5 shows a three-day snapshot of LMPs at bus 14.
During the first 28 hours of this period, local congestion does
not affect the LMPs and perfect competition actually produces
a slightly higher average LMP. From about hour 28 onwards,
strategic bidding can be used to create arbitrage opportunities
by driving the LMPs down and up. Local congestion cases
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Fig. 5: LMP at bus 14 on days 100–102 with a 50% line capacity
reduction.
enhance these opportunities by extending the periods of lower
and higher LMPs. Such price differences are valuable for
storage because they make it possible to charge at low prices
and discharge at high prices. Nontrivial profit differences
between perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets stem
from such infrequent periods with substantial price differences.
Figure 6 shows the histogram of daily profits for a stor-
age located at bus 19. In the perfect competition case, the
histogram does not exhibit a clear pattern. Local congestion
increases the number of higher profit days and, to a lesser
extent, the number of lower profit days, resulting in a higher
total annual profit. The histogram for imperfect competition
case is smoother and more evenly distributed. There are much
fewer low profit days and many more high profit days. Here
again, congestion increases the number of high profit days.
Fig. 6: Histogram of daily storage profits at bus 19.
IV. CONCLUSION
Local transmission congestion can alternate locational
marginal prices substantially. Although these differences can
enhance the profitability of energy storage systems, local
congestion can hamper the ability of storage to participate in
arbitrage on a transmission system level. This paper quantifies
these effects by simulating the outcomes of market-clearing
in a system with a large amount of storage and wind gen-
eration under both perfect and imperfect competition. These
simulations show that a modest level of local transmission con-
gestion increases nodal market-clearing prices, which results
in higher energy storage profits. Depending on the location
of the storage, this profitability is sustained even for severe
local congestion. Imperfect competition is also shown to help
storage increase their profits by influencing the LMPs. The
results also show the importance of the storage location on its
profitability.
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